Introduction
A large social-science literature is emerging on the determinants of happiness and mental well-being. As would be expected, this topic has attracted attention from medical statisticians, psychologists, economists, and other investigators (including recently Easterlin 2003 , Blanchflower and Oswald 2004 , Helliwell and Putnam (2004 , Lucas et al 2004 , Layard 2005 , Smith et al 2005 , Gilbert 2006 , and Kahneman et al 2006 . However, a fundamental research question remains poorly understood. What is the relationship between age and well-being?
Traditional surveys of the field, such as Myers (1992) , Diener et al (1999) and Argyle (2001) , argue that happiness is either flat or slightly increasing in age. New work, however, has shown that there is some evidence of a U-shape through the life cycle. In cross-sections, even after correcting for potentially confounding influences, there is now thought to be a well-determined convex link between reported wellbeing and age. This finding is reported in Clark and Oswald (1994) , Gerlach and Stephan (1996) , Theodossiou (1998) , Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) , Blanchflower (2001) , Di Tella et al (2001 , 2003 , Frey and Stutzer (2002) , Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) , Graham (2005) , Oswald (1997) , Frijters et al (2004 Frijters et al ( , 2005 , Senik (2004) , Van Praag and Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2004) , Shields and Wheatley Price (2005) , Oswald and Powdthavee (2005, 2007) , Propper et al (2005) , Powdthavee (2005) , Bell and Blanchflower (2007) , and Uppal (2006) . Clark et al (1996) makes the argument for job satisfaction equations. Pinquart and Sorensen (2001) develops an equivalent case for a measure of loneliness, and Hayo and Seifert (2003) does so for a measure of economic subjective well-being. Jorm (2000) reviews psychiatric evidence and concludes that there are conflicting results on how total we find a statistically significant U-shape in happiness or life satisfaction by age estimated separately for seventy four countries -Albania; Argentina; Australia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Belgium; Bosnia; Brazil; Brunei; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Canada; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Estonia; Finland; France; France; Germany; Greece; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Kyrgyzstan; Laos; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia; Malta; Mexico; Myanmar; Netherlands; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Puerto Rico; Romania; Russia; Serbia; Singapore; Slovakia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Sweden; Switzerland; Tanzania; Turkey; United Kingdom; Ukraine; Uruguay; USA; Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe..
One point should be made clear from the outset. It is that the paper will concentrate mostly on so-called single-item measures of well-being, so cannot allow subtle differentiation --as favoured in some psychology journals --into what might be thought of as different types of, or sides to, human happiness or mental health.
Nevertheless, the patterns that emerge seem of interest. The paper's concern is with the ceteris paribus correlation between well-being and age, so we later partial out some other factors, such as income and marital-status, that alter over a typical person's lifetime and have an effect upon well-being. This follows one particular tradition of empirical research. We read the effect of a variable's coefficient from a long regression equation in which other influences have been controlled for as effectively as possible.
Despite the commonness of this convention in modern social-science research, such a method is not inevitable. A valid and different approach is that of, for example, Mroczek and Kolanz (1998) and Easterlin (2006) , who control for few or no other influences upon well-being, and instead scrutinize the aggregate uncorrected relationship between happiness and age. These authors focus on a reduced-form issue. They largely ask the descriptive question: how does observed happiness vary over the life cycle? Related work is that of Mroczek and Spiro (2005) , who establish in a data set on American veterans, where the youngest person in the data set is 40 years old --making it hard to do an exact comparison with our later random samples --that happiness rises into the person's early 60s, and then appears to decline.
As common observation shows, the quality of a person's health and physical abilities can depend sensitively on the point in the life cycle. Most diseases, and the probability of getting them, worsen with age. A 90 year old man cannot in general do the same number of push-ups as a 20 year old man. Hence an important issue is whether in happiness equations it is desirable to control in some way for health and physical vitality. There is here no unambiguously correct answer. But the approach taken in the paper is not to include independent variables that measure physical health. This is partly pragmatic: our data sets have no objective measures and few subjective ones. But the decision is partly substantive: it seems interesting to ask whether people become happier as they age once demographic and economic variables are held constant.
There is relatively little social-science theory upon which to draw (though mention should be made of Carstensen's theory, which, put informally, is that age is associated with increasing motivation to derive emotional meaning from life and decreasing motivation to expand one's horizons: see Carstensen et al 1999 and Charles et al 2001) . Conventional economics is in principle capable of making predictions about the life cycle structure of happiness --if conceptualized as utility in the normal economist's framework. In practice, however, the theory does not appear to generate a U-shape in any natural way. Instead, perhaps the most natural conclusion is that well-being might be predicted to be independent of age. To see why, let the individual agent be concerned to maximize lifetime utility V by choosing a consumption path c(a) where a is the individual's age. Assume, for simplicity, that lifespan runs deterministically from time point t to time point T, and that there is no discounting. Let income, y, be fixed and given by the agent's talent endowment, and for simplicity normalize this to unity. Then the agent chooses consumption, c, at each age, a, to maximize lifetime happiness
subject to an inter-temporal borrowing constraint
in which the endowment of income to be allocated across all the periods has been set to one. Assume that u, utility, or well-being, is an increasing and concave function of consumption, c. Spending, by assumption, makes people happier, but at a diminishing rate. This is the simplest kind of isoperimetric problem. The first-order condition for a maximum is the usual one: it requires the marginal utility of consumption to be the same at each level of age, a. Therefore, solving a Lagrangean L constructed from
(1) and (2):
where, from the underlying mathematical structure, the multiplier lambda is necessarily constant across all the different ages from t to T. Individuals thus allocate their discretionary spending to the points in time when they enjoy it most.
If the utility function u(c, a) is additively separable in consumption c and age a, then equation (3) has a simple implication. It is one that is implicit, though perhaps not always articulated, in much of standard economic theory. Consumption will be flat through time (because under separability u = u(c)) + v(a)) and, therefore, utility will also be flat through the lifespan if the non-consumption part of utility, v(.), is independent of age. In plainer language, happiness will not alter over a person's life course.
It seems reasonable to suggest that to go from the utility function u = u(c, a) to the presumption that u(..) is additively separable in its two arguments is a large, and potentially unwarranted, step. There is no clear reason why the marginal utility of consumption would be independent of a person's age. For example, one might believe that young people wish to signal their status more, and therefore might have a greater return from units of consumption than the old (so the cross-partial derivative of u(c, a) would then be negative). Alternatively, one might argue that older people have more need of health and medical spending, and therefore that the marginal utility of consumption is greatest at high levels of age. Then, of course, the crosspartial of u(c, a) is positive. While it would be possible to assume that early in life the first effect dominates and then in later life the second one dominates, and in this way get eventually to a model where well-being was curved through the lifespan, to do so seems too ad hoc (or perhaps one would say post-hoc) to be persuasive theoretically.
What this means is that textbook economic analysis, at least as based on normal assumptions of lifetime maximization and the concavity of utility, is --without making assumptions about v(a) that could mechanically lead to any shape --not capable of producing clear predictions about the nonlinear pattern of well-being through an individual's life.
Empirical Results
To explore this issue empirically, we draw upon a number of data sets --they combine data on hundreds of thousands of randomly selected individuals --and implement a test that controls for the possible existence of cohort effects. Our data do not follow the same individuals through time. They provide repeated statistically representative snapshots year after year. Other approaches to the cohort-effects problem have recently been proposed, using British longitudinal data, by and .
The key evidence in the paper is summarized in five tables. It estimates a happiness regression equation for this sub-sample, and reveals in its early columns that well-being is U-shaped in age. Then cohort variables are introduced. These take the form of a set of dummy variables -one dummy for each decade of birth. Although the introduction of the cohort dummies affects the turning point of the quadratic function in age, it does not do so in a way that changes the thrust of the idea that psychological well-being follows a U-shaped path. The same statistical procedure is adopted for the analysis of three further sub-samples, namely, the females in the GSS data set, the males in the Eurobarometer survey, and finally the females in the same European sample. We typically test for a U-shape by examining whether the data take a quadratic form in age. The coefficients on agesquared variables are usually statistically significant at the 0.0001 level.
In the first column of happiness function that reaches a minimum at 35.7 years of age. This is effectively the U-shape result in the recent literature.
However, Table 1 then explores the possibility that the U-shape in age is a product merely of omitted cohort effects. Column 3 of Table 1 extends the specification by introducing a separate dummy variable --termed in the table Born<1910-1919 , Born 1920 -1929 , and so on --for each decade of birth (to avoid complete collinearity, we cannot enter a full set of individual birth-year dummies).
The outcome of this exercise is a U-shape in age, but, interestingly, one where the turning point for Americans males is now noticeably later in the typical individual's life. According to the evidence in column 3 of Table 1 , subjective well-being among randomly selected American males, bottoms out at an estimated 52.9 years. This is to be thought of, it should be said, as the minimum-happiness age after controlling for other influences such as income, education and marital-status. Column 4 then adds the logarithm of household income, to allow for the influence of income upon reported happiness (although the causal interpretation here is perhaps open to debate, Gardner and Oswald 2007 document longitudinal evidence that windfalls raise mental well-being). Income enters positively with a t-statistic of approximately 12; the age minimum is 52.6, and thus barely alters.
A quadratic might be thought restrictive. Column 5 now tests for a U-shape without imposing any functional form. To do so, the age and age squared variables are replaced with a series of dummy variables representing five-year age bands.
Despite the non-parametric form of the test, something fairly close to a quadratic emerges over most of the life course, although it turns over again slightly in late life.
The happiness minimum in column 5 of Table 1 occurs in the age band 50-54 years.
In our other data sets, the change in the minimum of the happiness U shape after the inclusion of cohort dummies is less pronounced. Table 2 , for example, reports the same exercise for the females in the US General Social Survey. The pooled sample size is a little larger (because women live longer than men) at 25,837
individuals. Once again, each individual gives a well-being score on a three-point scale from very happy down to not at all happy, and Table 2 estimates an ordered logit equation with the same structure as for the males in Table 1 . Perhaps surprisingly, the analytical structure for American women is almost the same as for the men. In Table 2 , well-being is at first increasing in age. But once a squared term in age is introduced, in the third column, it is clear that the data favour the quadratic form, and once again happiness is strongly U-shaped in age. When the same set of cohort dummies are incorporated into the equation, in column 4 of Table 2 , the turning point of the happiness function is at age of 38.6 years, which is well below the value for men obtained in column 4 of Table 1 of 52.9 years.
With a few differences, Tables 3 and 4 tell the same broad story, although they use Eurobarometer data pooled from 1976 to 2002. Here the continent is different and the sample sizes far larger. A slightly different form of well-being question (on life satisfaction) has to be employed, but as these estimation methods effectively use only the ordering of well-being answers, the exact wording is perhaps unlikely to matter (and so empirically it seems to prove). In Table 3 , an ordered logit is estimated for 293,612 males from France, Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Austria. To allow comparisons, the aim is to achieve an econometric specification as close as possible, despite some differences in the data sets on topics such as the level of detail in the measure of income, to that for the United States in Tables 1 and 2 . Before the cohort dummies are introduced, the turning point in the male well-being equation is at a minimum where age is equal to 44.5 years (see column 2 of Table 3 ). It is not easy to say why this number might be lower than in the USA (see column 2 of Table 1 ), but one conjecture is that the Second World War may have exacted a different toll on this generation of European males. Here the age at which well-being reaches a minimum in the full specification is 46.5 years, which is below the American number. A full set of interaction terms -where both the age and age squared terms were interacted with the other independent variables --was also tried, as a robustness check, but these were found to have coefficients that were almost always insignificantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
At the suggestion of a referee, Appendix Tables 2 and 3 slowly build up independent variables in well-being equations. These illustrate the case for males only. It can be seen that, especially in the United States, the addition of the maritalstatus variables has a noticeable effect on the turning point of the U-shape.
Even if statistically significant, is such a U-shape in age large enough to be important empirically? The data suggest that the answer is yes.
One way to explore this is to compare the levels of well-being between, say, age 20 and age 45. This difference --in the equations that control for other factors --is approximately 0.1 to 0.2 cardinal well-being points, and this is around one fifth of a standard deviation in well-being scores. At first sight that does not appear particularly large. But, because the standard deviation is dominated by cross-section variation in reported well-being, there is a more useful and evocative way to think about the size of the age and age-squared effect. Going from age 20 to age 45 is approximately equal to one third of the size of the effect of the unemployment coefficient in a well-being equation. That is suggestive of a large effect on wellbeing.
Although the birth-cohort coefficients (on Born<1900, Born 1900 Born -1910 are not always individually well-defined, there are signs from the Tables that the United States and Europe differ quite strongly in the time structure of the cohort effects upon happiness. In Tables 1 and 2 , there is evidence that successive American generations became progressively less happy from 1900 to today. This conclusion is reminiscent of one of Easterlin's (2006) , although he uses a different statistical method.
In Europe, by contrast, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that cohort well-being falls initially from the beginning of the century but, after bottoming out in the 1950s
(which is the omitted base category), has actually been rising slightly throughout the most recent generations.
As with the effect of moving along the quadratic function in age, cohort dummy variables are here large in magnitude; they are not merely different from zero on a formal significance test. Put loosely, cohort effects are two or three times as large as the effect from the U-shape in age. The single greatest effect is visible in the equations for US males in Table 1 . Here, comparing the happiest cohort of Americans to the least happy, the cardinalized well-being difference through the generations exceeds half of one standard-deviation of the happiness measure. In all the tables, whilst the details differ, estimated cohort effects are quantitatively significant and not merely statistically significant.
On a cautious note, it might be argued that the use of language itself could have altered over the century (perhaps modern generations of highly educated TVwatchers have become linguistically more or less expressive), and hence that in the US and Europe the paper's estimated happiness-cohort effects are partly or wholly an illusion caused by this changing nature of words. It is not easy to guard against such possibilities in a definitive way. Nevertheless, one piece of evidence against such a view comes out of the clear difference between the two continents' results. The estimated pattern of the cohort effects is very different between the US and Europe.
As --no doubt because of common trends in technology --both continents' ways of living have changed in broadly similar ways since 1900, it is not easy to see how the coefficients on the cohort dummies could be explained solely by some form of changed use of language in the modern world. Thus these cohort effects seem unlikely to be simply a mirage caused by alterations in the way that different generations use, and perceive the meaning of, words. 1981-1984; 1989-1993; 1994-1999; and 1999-2004 . These data are drawn from twenty five Western countries such as the USA, Canada and the UK; fourteen East European countries (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland); and thirty seven developing countries (e.g. China, Uganda, Uruguay and Vietnam). Table 5 reports estimates of a series of life satisfaction equations with well-being scored from 1 at the dissatisfied end to 10 at the completely satisfied end; we report them separately for each of the three groups of countries.
Controls here include workforce-status, marital-status, schooling, country and year dummies, and the person's income (grouped into appropriate deciles for his or her country). A U-shape in age is found in all five columns of So far, our focus has been on happiness and life satisfaction. It seems useful to ask whether a life course U-shape also emerges when the well-being variable is closer to a measure of mental health. There are approximately one million observations (n=972,464), and the estimates are weighted using the person weights so are nationally representative. Respondents in the LFS are asked to report on any health problems they have had, and then to identify the most important of these and that is what is examined here.
What is graphed in Figure 1 is the mean incidence by age. The figure has an average of 17,068 observations per cell (i.e. per dot). The outcome is a hill-shaped relationship between the incidence of depression-and-anxiety and age, which maximises around age 46 in these raw data. Hence this seems consistent with the paper's earlier, and qualitatively different, life-satisfaction evidence.
Using the dprobit procedure in STATA, Table 7 estimates the probability an individual in the LFS will report being depressed. In column 1, without any controls, probability of depression = 0.0021416Age -0.000024Age 2 where n=972,464. The quadratic maximises at age 44.6. Adding additional controls has fairly little impact.
The maximum is finally estimated at 44.0 in column 3 with a full set of controls for month, year, region, race, education, marital and labour force status. March is the month in which the highest depression rates are reported. Tables 3 and 4 .
In the first two columns of 
Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?
To the answers to each of these six, we assigned the integers 0, 1, 2, 3 --depending whether each was answered not at all, no more than usual, rather more than usual, much more than usual. Following Blanchflower and Oswald (2007) , the numerical answers were summed, and we term the result a 'GHQ-N6' measure, where N stands for 'negative'. The mental distress score denoted GHQ-N6, must for a person therefore lie between 0 and 18. Across Europe, the mean of the variable is 3.6 (standard deviation 3.7). These six are the 6 negative questions from the fuller General Health Questionnaire GHQ-12 measure of psychological distress. The data set does not provide data on the other six 'positive' questions. Thus our focus is upon negative affect. Oswald (1994, 2002) show in British data that GHQ is quadratic in age.
Although much remains to be understood, there is a precedent for exploring separately the negative and positive questions within the GHQ (see Huppert and Whittington, 2003) . Column 1 of Table 7 just contains age and its square as controls, and the function reaches a maximum at age 47.8. Adding additional controls for workforce-status, marital-status, and schooling, reduces the maximum marginally to 46.8. In both cases, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the method of estimation.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 use the same sample of individuals and same controls as in columns 1 and 2; but now ordered logit is the method of estimation, and life satisfaction is the dependent variable. In column 3, without controls, life satisfaction minimises at age 49.5 (and 49.3 in column 4).
Overall, the two kinds of results in the paper seem approximately mirrorimages of one another. Happiness and life satisfaction are U-shaped in age; distress and depression follow an inverted U-shape.
Conclusions
This paper offers evidence that well-being depends in a curvilinear way upon age: happiness is approximately U-shaped through the life course. Psychological
well-being appears to reach a minimum in middle age. This conclusion is meant as a broad characterization of the data, and should be kept in perspective. There is, for example, a little evidence from our non-parametric work for a further flattening, and turn down, towards the end of life. The paper's results, which draw upon regression equations, and use data sets long enough to distinguish age effects from cohort effects, seem of interest. They suggest that the convex structure of the curve is fairly similar across different parts of the world. To the best of our knowledge, the U-shape finding in United States data comes originally from results reported in Blanchflower et al (1993) , which became Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) . Because the paper's equations control for many other influences upon happiness and life satisfaction --including income, education and marriage --the findings should be read as describing an age U-shape in ceteris-paribus well-being.
Our correction for birth-cohort influences makes some difference to the results claimed by the earlier literature, especially in American well-being equations, but the spirit of a U-shape is unaffected by cohort effects. On these estimates, happiness among American males and females reaches a minimum in, respectively, approximately their early 50s and late 30s. Reported life satisfaction levels among European men and women minimize around the mid 40s.
It might reasonably be objected that our method has had to rely on decadal proxies for cohorts of Americans and Europeans. How to do better than this, nevertheless, is not clear --as one aim is to maintain also age and year effects within the equations. Moreover, if subtler cohort effects were of major importance, we might expect to see more evidence of equation instability when they are imperfectly introduced in the form of the decade-long dummy variables.
By definition, this paper has one limitation. It is that these international data sets do not follow the same individuals over the years. As far as we know, there is no internationally comparable panel data set on multiple nations in which general happiness or well-being questions are asked (a European Household Panel is currently being constructed but asks only questions such as income-satisfaction and housing-satisfaction). It is perhaps also worth pointing out that panel data have their own disadvantages, particularly that of sometimes high levels of measurement error.
What causes the apparently U-shaped curve in human well-being, and the rough regularity of its mathematical shape in different parts of the developed and developing world, is unknown. Tentatively:
• One possibility is that individuals learn to adapt to their strengths and weaknesses, and in mid-life quell their infeasible aspirations.
• Another --though it could presumably only be a small part of the explanation --is that cheerful people live systematically longer than the miserable, for reasons not currently understood, and that the well-being U-shape in age thus traces out in part a selection effect.
• A third is that a kind of comparison process is at work: I have seen schoolfriends die and come eventually to value my blessings during my remaining years.
Whatever its ultimate causes, understanding the roots of the pattern seems an important task. Notes The dependent variable, here and in later tables, is a measure of subjective well-being. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; they test the null hypothesis of a coefficient of zero. The six regression equations are to be read vertically. They are ordered logits and include 25 year-dummies and 9 region-dummies. 'Personal controls' are the number of years of education, two race-dummies, 8 workforce-status dummies, 4 marital-status dummies, 1 dummy to identify if the respondent has zero dependent children, and a further dummy to identify if at age 16 the children was not living with both parents as they were divorced.. The 'base' cohort is that for people born pre-1900. The data set excludes 1972 when income is excluded; surveys were not conducted in 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 . The exact wording of the well-being question is: "Taken all together, how would you say things are these days -would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?". Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2006 T-statistics in parentheses. 1981-1984; 1989-1993; 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 . Controls are 9 income deciles, 5 marital-status dummies, 9 schooling dummies, 3 year-dummies and 7 workforce-status dummies. Notes; The dependent variable is a measure of subjective wellbeing and estimated as ordered logits. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; they test the null hypothesis of a coefficient of zero. All six regression equations here are to be read vertically. The surveys were not conducted in 1979, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 . The exact wording of the wellbeing question is: "Taken all together, how would you say things are these days -would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?". Source: General Social Survey, 1972 Appendix The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. All equations are ordered logits and include 16 country-dummies and 23 year dummies. 'Personal controls' are 9 educational-qualification dummies, 6 workforce-status dummies, and 5 marital-status dummies. The 'base' excluded cohort is that for people born pre-1900. The data set excludes 1981, and columns 2-4 also exclude 1979 and 1981, 1995 and 1996 because there are no income variables for those years. The exact wording of the wellbeing question is: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?" The countries are France, Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Austria.. Source: Eurotrends file ( Eurobarometer ICPSR #3384) 
